Abstract-We propose a new secure and fast hashing algorithm with multiple security levels (SFHA-MSL). It is based on the generic 3C (3 compressions) construction and the 3C-X (3C XOR) hash function which is the simplest and efficient variant of the generic 3C hash function and it is the simplest modification to the Merkle-Damgard (M-D) iterated construction that one can achieve. The design principle of the proposed algorithm is to have variable output length of 128, 192 and 256 bits, variable number of compression functions, variable number of iterations in each compression function and variable compression function structure. The compression function used in this algorithm is more dynamic in the sense that the input controls what happen in the algorithm. This enable us to achieve a novel design principle: when message is changed, different shift rotations are done which causes more complexity for someone trying to create a collision. Instead of mixing a single word of a message block, four words are mixed per iteration which achieve faster data diffusion and hence better avalanching effect. There is no message expansion in the proposed scheme and it doesn't use Boolean functions but uses only addition, XOR and rotations to achieve its security. This in addition to increasing the algorithm efficiency, it distributes non-linearity among all blocks in a round.
I. INTRODUCTION
A hash function accepts a variable-size message m as input and produces a fixed-size hash code H(m), sometimes called a message digest, as output. The hash code is a function of all the bits of the message and provides an error-detection capability: a change to any bit or bits in the message results in a change to the hash code [1] . Historically, the first designs for hash functions have been based on block ciphers; several successful proposals are still widely in use. A second approach has been the use of modular arithmetic. In order to obtain a better performance, cryptographers started in the late eighties to design efficient custom hash function [2] . The hash function must have three desirable properties:
One-way: for any given code h, it is computationally infeasible to find x such that H(x) = h.
Weak collision resistance: for any given block x, it is computationally infeasible to find y ≠ x with H(y) = H(x).
Strong collision resistance: it is computationally infeasible to find any pair (x , y) such that H(x) = H(y).
Most of hash functions are iterated hash function and most of compression functions are iterated by MerkleDamgard (M-D) construction with constant IV (initial variable) as shown in Fig. 1 .
In this construction the hash function takes an input message and partitions it into L -1 fixed-sized block of b bits each. The final block is padded to b bits. The final block also includes the value of the total length of the input to the hash function. The inclusion of the length makes the job of the opponent more difficult. Either the opponent must find two message of equal length that hash to the same value or two messages of differing lengths that, together with their length values, hash to the same value.
The hash algorithm involves repeated use of a compression function, f, that takes two inputs (an n-bit input from the previous step, called the chaining variable; CV and a b-bit block) and produces an n-bit output. At the start of hashing, the chaining variable has an initial value (CV O ) that is specified as part of the algorithm. The final value of the chaining variable is the hash value. Usually, b > n; hence the term compression. The hash function can be summarized as follows:
(1)
Figure1. Merkle-Damgard iterated construction.
where the input to the hash function is a message m consisting of the blocks
Keep in mind that for any hash function there must exist collisions, because we are mapping a message of length at least equal to the block size b into a hash code of length n, where b > n [3] . Cryptanalysis of hash functions proves that the M-D hash construction is not immune to extend attack, fix point attack and multi-blocks attack, moreover, some slight weakness in compression function may results in failure of hash function so some improved constructions such as wide-pipe, double-pipe and the generic 3C (3 compression) constructions are developed. But the generic 3C construction prevents extension attacks in a more efficient way than both the wide-pipe and doublepipe constructions without increasing the size of the internal state [4] . This construction as shown in Fig. 2 consists of two compression functions: f which is iterated in the cascade chain and f \ which is iterated in the accumulation chain. First, the message is processed in an iterated manner over the function f which itself is based on the M-D construction then this output is padded using the standard padding technique (appending Z with a bit 1 and some 0's followed by the binary encoded representation of the length of Z ) to make it a block of b bits. This is denoted with ZPAD operation in Fig.2 .
Finally the accumulated output of the function f \ is padded then fed as input to the external application f. It should be noted that the padding is performed twice for the 3C construction; once for the basic cascade construction and next on Z to get the accumulation chain block. The construction is called 3C as it requires at least three applications of the compression function to process the message and three being the least when there is only one message block, the first application of the compression function processes that single block, the second application processes the padded block and the third application processes the block due to the accumulation chain function [5] . If the function f \ is replaced with XOR operation we will obtain the 3C-X hash function shown in Fig. 3 . The 3C-X hash function is the simplest efficient modification to M-D construction.
In this paper we introduce a new design for a secure one-way hashing algorithm based on both the generic 3C and the 3C-X hash construction with an efficient and dynamic compression function and different levels of security to resist the advanced attacks, such as preimage, second preimage and collision attacks. All simulation programs are performed by using MATHEMATICA. 5 and test values are given. The overall processing of SFHA-MSL consists of four steps: set up, pre-processing, iterated processing and output transformation. The set up step is used to select secret parameters (output length, number of compression functions, and number of iterations in each compression function) which are used in the processing step. Both the sender and the verifier use the same secret parameters. Pre-processing step involves padding a message, parsing the padded message and setting initialization values to be used in the iterated processing step. The output transformation is used in a final step to map the n bits to variable lengths. The following operations will be used in the processing and all of these operators act on 32 bit word + : addition mod 2 32 , ⊕ : XOR, ∧ : AND, ∨ : OR, A <<< s : s-bit left shift rotation a 32-bit string.
III. SFHA-MSL PRE-PROCESSING
The pre-processing step is used to prepare the message before the SFHA-MSL processing step. It consists of three steps: padding the message, parsing the padded message into message blocks, and setting the initial hash values.
A. Padding the Message
An input message is processed by 512-bit block. SFHA-MSL pads a message by appending a single bit 1 next to the least significant bit of the message, followed by zero or more bits 0's until the length of the message is 448 modulo 512, and then appends to the message the 64-bit original message length modulo 2 32 . 
B. Parsing the Padded Message

C. Setting the Initial Hash Value
Before hash computation begins for SFHA-MSL, the initial hash values (MDB) must be set. The MDB is 512 bits used to hold intermediate and final results. The MDB can be represented as eight 32-bit words registers A 0 , B 0 , C 0 , D 0 , E 0 , F 0 , G 0 , H 0 which are obtained by taking the fractional part of the square roots of the first eight primes in hexagonal values:
The iterated processing step depends upon the secret parameters used. 
A. Iterated Compression Functions
where M is the re-ordering of message words for the two branches as follows:
, where the order is reversed.
B. Constants
The compression functions of SFHA-MSL uses sixteen constants for Branch 1 which are ordered as following:
β 7 = ab1c5ed5 β 8 = d807aa98 β 9 = 12835b01 β 10 = 243185be β 11 = 550c7dc3 β 12 = 72be5d74 β 13 = 80deb1fe β 14 = 9bdc06a7 β 15 = c19bf174. For Branch 2 the order is reversed.
By using these constants we achieve the goal to disturb the attacker who tries to find good differential characteristics with a relatively high probability. So, we prefer the constants which represent the first thirty-two bits of the fractional parts of the cube roots of the first sixteen prime numbers.
C. Iterated Function
The registers content of the k-th iteration is divided into eight 64-bit words:
. SFHA-MSL has two different iteration function: the generic 3C and the 3C-X iteration functions.
The generic 3C iterated function: For the k + 1 iteration the following computations are done (see Figure. 5 ):
Figure. 
where 0 ≤ k ≤ (R`/4) -1 and R` is a secret parameter used by both the sender and the verifier. R` can be one of three possible values : 16 , 32 , 48.
The 3C-X iteration function: For the k + 1 iteration the following computations are done (see Figure 6 ):
(13)
Figure.6 Iteration function of the 3C-X compression function.
where 0 ≤ k ≤ (L`/4) -1 and L` is a secret parameter used by both the sender and the verifier. L` can be one of three possible values : 16 , 32 , 48. In these equations k represents the number of iteration of the compression function. Initially for k = 0 the amounts of shift rotations for the generic 3C and the 3C-X iteration function are constant values then for the successive values of k the shift rotations become dynamic as it depends on the input (the content of the registers) as shown in Table I .
For the two iteration functions there is no message expansion part, instead the sixteen words of each message block (M 0 , M 1 … M 15 ) are mixed more than one time depending on the secret parameters used R` and L` as shown in Table II .
The final output of the generic 3C hash function section (Double Compression Function, DCF) is given by:
The final output of the 3C-X hash function section (Triple Compression Function, TCF) is given by:
where N is the number of blocks in the padded message.
V. SFHA-MSL OUTPUT TRANSFORMATION
The output transformation step is a modular summation used to map the final output of the two output (C 1 , C 2 ) of 256 bit to variable output length ( n = 128, 192, 256 bits). This length is also a secret parameter. The final output is given by:
A. SFHA-MSL with DCF Output
Case 128-bit digest:
Case 192-bit digest:
Case 256-bit digest: Case 192-bit digest:
VI. SFHA-MSL TEST RESULTS
Two tests were run on both SFHA-MSL and SHA-256 for comparison between the collision resistance and uniformity of each.
A. Collision and Avalanche Tests
To test for collisions and avalanching effect of the algorithms two different sets of data were run through both SFHA-MSL and SHA-256. Each set of data consists of a single block of data (512 bit) without padding and has a single bit of change from input to input.
The 3 3
We applied 24 successive inputs (with a single bit changed from input to input) to the two algorithms divided as following: Eight inputs ( from input 1 to input 8 ): With a single bit changed from input to input moving forward from the most significant bit to the least significant bit of the underlined most significant byte, 01100001. Eight inputs (from input 9 to input 16 ): With a single bit changed from input to input moving forward from the most significant bit to the least significant bit of the underlined middle (32 nd ) byte,01100110. Eight inputs ( from input 17 to input 24 ) : With a single bit changed from input to input moving forward from the most significant bit to the least significant bit of the underlined least significant byte, 01101100.
The Second set of data: Its basic input is a file consists of 64 letter all are the same letter, "A", in binary, 01000001, and we repeat the same steps as in the first set of data.
The results of comparing the hashed values of the successive inputs for the two sets of data are listed in Table III . These hashed values were first checked for collisions, none were found. Next the bits of the hash were compared from hash to successive hash, in position, checking to see how many bits were different due to a single bit change in the input, and then the average is taken. In a perfect avalanche: a single bit change from input to input causes half of the bits (128 bit) change from hash to hash [5] . So the optimum number of differing bits = 128. Looking at the results in Table III we conclude that SFHA-MSL with both DCF and TCF has a larger average number of differing bits for the two sets of data and so it has a better avalanching effect than SHA-256. . Practically, it is impossible to obtain a perfect uniform distribution hash algorithm. Instead, the less the deviation from the uniform distribution the more secure the algorithm is. Three sets of messages were used for these tests: the first, middle, and last ten possible input values for both SFHA-MSL and SHA-256. These ranges are: 0x00….00 to 0x00…...09, 0x10…..00 to 0x10…..09 and 0xff….06 to 0xff…..ff. Then the average hash value for each of these sets is computed and compared with that of the uniform distribution then the deviation is computed for the two algorithms. In Table IV we give the results of the comparison between SFHA-MSL and SHA-256. The deviation from optimal uniform distribution = [(uniform distribution average value -actual average value)/ uniform distribution average value].
B. Uniform Distribution Tests
From these results, SFHA-MSL does better than SHA-256 for all three sets of data. The most important data point being the deviation from the optimal uniform distribution. SFHA-MSL deviation is smaller than SHA-256. This means that SFHA-MSL has a more uniformly distributed output than SHA-256 and so it is more secure than it.
VII. SFHA-MSL TIME COMPLEXITY
In this section we give a complexity analysis on the operations used in SFHA-MSL with DCF and TCF and value of R` and L` =16 then compare it with SHA-256 to indicate the efficiency of SFHA-MSL. This comparison is indicated in Table V .
A. SFHA-MSL with DCF
As we mentioned previously the generic 3C hash function section consists of two compression functions are f 1 
B. SFHA-MSL with TCF
With the addition of the 3C-X hash function to the generic 3C hash function we obtain a TCF ( f 1 
VIII. SFHA-MSL SIMULATED RESULTS
For a simple message M = "abc", the 8-bit ASCII message "abc" has length l = 24 bits and it is given by "01100001 01100010 01100011". It is padded with a one "1", so 24 + 1+ k = 448 mod 512 and then k = 423 zero bits. Append the 64-bit block that is equal to the number l written in binary "0000……011000" and then its length are 512-bits padded message.
The "abc" message has a single (N =1) 512 bit block. Parse the 512 bits into 16 32-bit words M 0 , M 1 … M 15 ( in hexadecimal). 61626380 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000018
These 16 32-bit words are mixed more than one time depending on the secret parameter used with no message expansion.
The SFHA-MSL with different cases will be represented by SFHA-MSL\N\R`\L`\K, where N, R`, L` and K are secret dynamic parameters used by the sender and verifier. D703AF16 0B3F3407 7E82FC19 C0FBF257 A0976776 D3E6D71F 3C5AE9B8 3185A7DB  D703AF16 0B3F3407 7E82FC19 C0FBF257 A0976776 D3E6D71F  D703AF16 0B3F3407 7E82FC19 C0FBF257  FE520E80 CB006687 B3DD1F9D 7FE37276 B8FBC27C CB697A52 DABB761D 2098FD46  FE520E80 CB006687 B3DD1F9D 7FE37276 B8FBC27C CB697A52  FE520E80 CB006687 B3DD1F9D 7FE37276 the SFHA-MSL are given in Table VI. X. CONCLUSIONS This paper presents a new secure and efficient hashing algorithm with different security levels called SFHA-MSL.
It is based on the generic 3C construction and the 3C-X hash function which is the simplest and efficient variant of the generic 3C hash function and it is the simplest modification to the M-D iterated construction that one can achieve.
All famous secure hash algorithms (SHA) given by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have fixed structure and fixed output length but SFHA-MSL has dynamic structure and variable output length so it can provide many choices for practical applications with different levels of security to resist the advanced attacks such as preimage, second preimage and collision attacks.
SFHA-MSL tests showed that it has a better avalanching effect and a more uniform distribution than SHA-256.
The time complexity of SFHA-MSL is compared with that of the SHA-256 and it gives excellent results.
